On Sentience

A new person e-mailed me (new to e-mailing me, not to reading Animal Person) and said he finds himself eating very little "meat" since reading! Congratulations, New Person!

He doesn't know if he will ever become a vegan but he does have a question about sentience: What does it mean? He alludes to things like consciousness, the avoidance of pain and "intelligence," and wants to know where the line is drawn. He also asks about roadkill and whether it is permissible.

I just found three different (but not vastly different) definitions of sentience in the first three books I searched, by Index, on the bookshelf closest to me. The most basic definitions usually center on the biological ability to experience pain. Then they expand to pleasure and pain and (not necessarily in this order) to the awareness of such things, and then on to what I like to include: boredom and frustration. That's for all the folks who think there's nothing objectionable about keeping animals in cages for decades as you are treating them "humanely."

Intelligence is explicitly not required. Sentience is about the ability to suffer (/feel pleasure, etc...). In 2008, there are no reputable scientists, as far as I know, who claim that nonhuman mammals, birds, reptiles or fish are not capable of suffering. I go to one of my favorite scholars on the subject: Jonathan Balcombe, from Pleasurable Kingdom: Animals and the Nature of Feeling Good.

"And while it may be difficult to assign sentience to invertebrates it should not be so with our more familiar cousins in the pantheon of life, the vertebrates. These creatures all have nervous systems, a suite of senses by which to perceive their worlds, and they all move about. Evolution has endowed each with the tools for avoiding pains and perils, and for securing rewards.
    We must put aside the prejudices we hold towards other creatures. They are built on two thousand years of pious presumption that humans are the chosen ones, inexorably walled-off from all the others. Nourished by the inescapable knowledge that we are evolutionarily continuous with the other beasts, we are now realizing--from scientific study and empathic observation--that ours is a planet rich with other minds and experiences.
    We can never actually share the mental experience of another creature, including another human. . . . . To deny animals conscious experiences is to deny that they plan, desire, anticipate, tease, grieve, enjoy, tolerate, and gauge. It is to reject that they make decisions" (63).

Balcombe's discussion about why we humans deny that fish and "certain members of the invertebrate horde, might be able to feel good" (185), is very helpful for anyone with a relative who hunts fish or who eats fish. And for a book full of fantastic examples of behaviors in nonhumans that we like to think are unique to us, check out Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson's Altruistic Armadillos, Zenlike Zebras: A Menagerie of 100 Favorite Animals.

Tomorrow I'll address the dicier aspects of New Person's query (though you're welcome to do so now, of course, in addition to commenting about anything else regarding sentience). One thing is clear from all definitions of sentience, and that is that the vast majority of nonhumans we have come to view as/use as "food," are likely feeling every bit of the misery you'd be feeling if you were in their position. And that includes the terror that results from being stalked and hunted. And being wounded and released or being able to escape wounded, perhaps with a bullet or arrow or hook lodged in you.  And that includes being ripped from your family, being imprisoned, being enslaved, and having your worth defined only by someone else's plans for you. And those plans involve your death on their schedule.

Comments

[Dan]

Regarding sentience, it is very clear that about 99.99% the animals used, exploited, and/or intentionally killed for food, clothing, entertainment, and experimentation have a central nervous and limbic system and are highly sentient, so there is no controversy regarding the avoidance of exploiting and killing animals with a limbic system as a moral baseline.

The difficulty and related controversy enter when the question of *going beyond animals with limbic systems* arises. The biological gear (e.g. a central nervous system/limbic system) that gives rise to a high degree of sentience in mammals, fish, and reptiles is not the same gear that may (or may not) give rise to some degree of sentience in those creature without a CNS or limbic system, such as insects.

Because a dog, chicken, or pig have a central nervous system, including a limbic system (the source of emotions, fear, and pleasure, etc.), I have a notion of what it might be like to be one of those animals. Outside of concepts and abstractions that occur in my mind, it’s probably a lot like what it’s like to be me. That is, perceptually, particularly in pain, pleasure, fear and relaxation, I very probably have at least approximately, if not close to exactly, the same subjective perceptual experience as those animals, with the only difference being that I might add conceptual experience on top of the perceptual experience.

I cannot say the same for insects. I have no idea what it might be like to be a spider or moth. When a chicken runs from a predator, she has a limbic system within a central nervous system, and therefore is almost certainly experiencing fear, and will experience pain if she is caught. When a spider, which lacks a limbic system, runs from a predator, it is difficult to know what perceptual experience the spider is having.

My conclusion is to draw the line at those animals with a limbic system (reptiles and birds, fish, and mammals); however, when it is reasonably possible, I give insects the benefit of the doubt. For example, I don’t kill insects in the house (I either let them hang out [sometimes literally] or let them safely outside). If there was an infestation of insects, however, and especially if they were harmful, I wouldn’t have a problem forcing them out of the house, including killing them as a self- or property defense measure.

[adam]

I think the question of sentience is largely a misnomer, an excuse to draw an ethical line. Individuals ought to be respected, cared for, attended to on an indivual basis. (Sentience-centered ethics still rely on animals' similarity to us).

I believe we ought to get away from centering morality around the essence of being and move toward centering our relations with others. Relation-centered ethics does not reduce morality to a regurgitated code and requires that we never assume moral decisions come easy.

Further, debating what "sentience" is, is only playing into rhetoric. Besides, even if a definition were established, one could deconstruct the defition to show how plants are also sentient and perhaps the Earth system and/or universe. The issue is that we ought not to carelessly, indifferently, cruely squash the desires and lives of others. Killing and exploiting nonhuman animals is (nearly always) oppression, oppression is always unjust, therefore we ought not to kill and exploit them (all things being equall).

[Nathan Schneider]

Great topic.

Rather than discussing WHO is (or might be) sentient, I will list WHAT *things* are definitely not sentient...

Plants (flowers, trees, cacti, ferns). Fungi (yeasts, molds, mushrooms). Microorganisms such as algae, amoebas, bacteria, and viruses. Animals that lack nervous systems (poriferans, placozoans, rhombozoans, orthonectids). Rocks and minerals. Objects made by humans such as hammers, televisions, and umbrellas.

One quick extra point:
Everyone who is sentient has interests — they can "want, desire, and prefer" [1].
Rights (as in "'animal' rights" or "labor rights") protect interests.

[1] http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/?p=15

My thoughts on consuming "roadkill"... Eating the body of anyone (nonhuman or human) who is accidentally killed, whatever the means, is inconsistent with respecting that individual's personhood.

My thoughts on "freeganism"... Eating the flesh or secretions of anyone (nonhuman or human) who is/was enslaved for purposes of obtaining said substances, whatever the price, is inconsistent with respecting that individual's personhood.

Speaking from experience with certain humans, both approaches are very slippery slopes. They make it quite easy to rationalize eating nonvegan foods in all sorts of situations. Also, they send confusing messages to onlookers. Eating someone's body or secretions diminishes the power of a "vegan" to generate meaningful cognitive dissonance in those around them. Vegans accomplish this with principled, consistent accordance with nonhuman personhood, and by not participating with nonhuman exploitation.

[Dan]

Some clarification regarding adam’s comment:

If sentience is relevant (and it is), then it needs to be defined, even if the definition is unavoidably imprecise. If sentience is irrelevant, then I’m not sure how one would distinguish a human from a pig from a tree from a rock. Sapience distinguishes humans from nonhumans, and it is a sufficient, but unnecessary, condition for inclusion in the moral community (i.e. moral community = those to whom we have direct duties). Sentience distinguishes those who have an interest in their lives and experience pleasure and pain, and therefore have an interest in inclusion in the moral community.

Aside from the difficulty of drawing the line with respect to, say, insects, this issue of sentience is simple and straightforward. Certainly, cows, pigs, and chickens are as deserving of inclusion in the moral community as humans due to their sentience. Plants are morally similar to rocks and hydrogen hydroxide due to the complete insentience of these things. (I refuse to discuss/debate this issue with anyone who seriously suggests that plants, water, or rocks are sentient or experience life and/or feel pain and pleasure.)

To be clear, we have indirect duties to the environment. That is, we ought to preserve the environment for future generations of sentient beings, to whom we have direct duties. We have no duties to the environment per se, only duties *regarding* the environment.

[Dan]

Well said, Nathan. I agree with your post entirely.

[adam]

Dan, surely sentience is a sufficient condition but I'm not entirely of the belief it is a necessary condition for moral considerability. Also, we certainly ought to treat individuals equally where they share similarities. Yet, at the samte time, I think differences also should be acknowledged and respected. I feel the defense of "sentience" as the center of morality reduces all else to exploitable things, creates a class of subordinates. I'm opposed to any form of calculative, systemic subordination. I don't think moraly considering plants and even rock formations threatens veganism, though, it does require us re-orient ouselves with Others. Again, I think the focus of ethics ought to be relationships, not essences.

I think Nathan's conclusions ought to draw attention to why privileging a Francionion liberalism can be problematic. Freeganism and eating roadkill are intriniscly wrong because they do not "respect personhood." This is a very ethnocentric conclusion since "respect" here is culturally relative. For instance, in some cultures eating one's dead relatives is a form of respecting and being respected by others. In the case of nonuman animals, roadkill species do not understand death as such, and therefore have no preference for how their dead flesh is to be utilized. We impose our ideas of respect onto them as if we know the best use for their bodies (incineration or burial); we are really just projecting our own preferences onto them. From this standpoint, almost any interaction a human has with a nonhuman is inherently disrespectful/exploitive. This Francionian liberalism relies on the humanist/athiest worldview where Reason rules, the very privileging of Reason that has justified the dominaiton/dominion of nonhuman animals. This type of thinking actualy only further distances ourselves from nonhuman animals both behaviorally and geographically. If anyone were to take "animal rights/abolition" to its final logic, they'd have to be either freegans or horticulturists in the woods because to do otherwise would always be indirectly contributing to millions of "accidental" animal deaths in the manufacturing and harvesting processes of sub/urban life.

[Dan]

Adam,

I agree with you that sentience is a sufficient condition but…not [necessarily] a necessary condition for moral considerability. Generally, moral considerability can come in the form of consideration of future utility or aesthetic value. Aesthetic value can even be considered to have some kind of inherent value. So, in the case of a beautiful flower or your example of (aesthetic) rock formations, we likely do have at least indirect moral obligations to not destroy such things because of the value others place on them even if we do not ourselves. Additionally in this example, we may claim that such aesthetic value is an inherent value in itself.

My concern is actually more practical and less philosophical/contemplative, however. In our society, we currently treat sentient beings – who have as much interest in their lives as we do in ours – in roughly the same way we treat dirt, high grass, and dead leaves. We slaughter 10 billion land animals for food annually in the US alone. This atrocity is the worst atrocity in which humanity has ever engaged, but we’re completely blind to it. A close second place is the fact that we have so little regard for sustainability of the planet to support (excessive human) life and excessive consumption that we’ll very likely render ourselves and many other species extinct either via pollution or warfare (if it must happen, hopefully it will be a biological warfare elimination of the human species only, so that other species can continue to enjoy their lives without our seemingly inherent cancerous behavior). Until we gain equality for animals, I’m not going to worry about aesthetics, although you’ll never catch me violating a flower or aesthetic rock formation. Animal rights and veganism (conceived within a liberal framework) will do nothing to harm the planet, and in fact would tremendously help it, so I’m not worried about the moral baseline that AR promotes violating ecological or any other concerns.

About road kill and freeganism, again the concern is more practical. When we start picking dead human parts and their bodily fluids out of dumpsters or taking “John Doe” humans killed in a car or plane accident home for dinner, then humans and animals will likely have some moral equality. Until then, Nathan is right to claim that eating animals in freegan contexts merely confuses the issue. Freegans and road kill eaters (yuck! says my bourgeois and vegan sensibilities) contribute to the notion that animals are as much or more food than (sentient) members of the moral community. Freegans are not eating animals out of respect for the being the dead corpse was. If they were, they’d be munching on their relatives also.

Finally, about Reason, yes, I unabashedly privileged reason. Yes, we can privilege reason too much, becoming valueless automatons who see ethics as emotional or cultural nonsense. But the postmodern extreme of ignoring or scoffing at reason is just as problematic and leads to valuelessness derived from irrational, free-floating moral relativity where ethics are reduced to the same emotional “venting” of one’s glands or cultural nonsense that the likes of AJ Ayer claims they are. What we need is a balance. Empathy gives us the substance of morality and reason gives us the form. Without empathy, our rationality is a cold, valueless, and empty structure. Without reason, our empathy is a heap of formless nonsense.

For more on this, the following concluding blog essay I wrote in a series on moral psychology may be of interest:

http://unpopularveganessays.blogspot.com/2007/10/moral-psychology-and-development.html

[Bea Elliott]

I think all the posters clarified "sentience" with due thought and reason.

I've suggested to a few rude omnivores, who insisted on their "right" to eat flesh - that they were free to eat what ever they wished, as long as beings didn't have to be enslaved or slaughtered for such "food". I suggested they troll the interstates for roadkill. Adam pointed out the aspect of "respect for personhood", and I have to agree... Roadkill is not acceptable. So much for that comeback...

Thank you Dan. I read your essay and was drawn to your entries on "sentience". For me your summation, reduced to one sentence, sums it up best: "Sentience is the morally relevant characteristic for the right to physical security".

I can only add in the abstract a thought of mine regarding animals who we know can feel pain, yet cannot "reason". I have a particular pity for them. I see that survivors - prisoners, oppressed, threatened and tortured humans have recounted that their minds were what was their salvation. That they could at least find comfort in some other plane of awareness. Some escaped in these better thoughts. Some found comfort that their suffering was for a "purpose", or at least that they'd find rest and peace with their God.

But what of animals who only have the present? The relentless pain and terror of now or "forever"? There is no cognitive abiltiy to "shift" the mind or find some kind of "meaning" for it all... It just is. In it's most base, and truly evil form there is only the suffering... and the aloneness in it. And in this way, I think it's possible that non-human animal suffering can actually be deeper than that of man's.

[Adam Kochanowicz]

In response to Adam, and to at the same time point out that this is a different "Adam" than me, :)

While I do believe plants are more complex creatures than we think, I don't at all agree that the sentience of animals like cows, pigs, or humans can be compared to the reactions we observe in a plant.

1. Eating an animal-derived diet accounts for more plant consumption anyway.
2. Flight/fight responses are helpful to a mobile species to drive it to get itself out of or confront danger. Why would such an adaptation benefit a plant?
3. Plants have no central nervous system.
4. Literature which defends the sentience of plants often observes very specific species including those we do not raise for consumption.
5. Frankly, arguments that reactions from plants due to external stimuli equal sentience are not very good.

[Brian]

The roadkill-eater does not confuse the issue, they clarify it. They clarify that it is not about diet, or weight gain, or any sentimental nonsense about respect for what is no longer sentient. They clarify that the issue is one of economics - that it is not wrong to EAT meat, or even to steal it, but to voluntarily finance those who would torture and murder animals from whom meat like it is harvested.